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(A version of Ibis paper appears as part of Chaptcr S of Sarfre cl Psychoanalysis: An Existentialisl
Challenge 10 Clinical MeUllheory, by Betty Cannon, publilhed by 111e Univenity of Kan... P~IS,
1991. This paper ia being published wilb their pennis.ion.)
In Sartre's tater philosophy, he substitutes need for desire as a description
of the basic relationship between hUDWl beings and the world. Some have laken
this substitution, along with Sartre's description ofhuman reality as praxis rather
than as consciousness or Being-Jor-itself, to be an abandonment of his earlier
ontology. While it is certainly true that the new terminology indicates a new
emphasis on social awareness and action in the socio-material world, the idea
that Sartre the Marxist has abandoned his earlier philosophy of freedom proves
not to be tbe case. Sartre himself says in an interview that his philosophy
"underwent a continuous evolution beginning with La Nausee all the way up to
the Cr;tique de La Raison DiaLeet;que...1 In any case, although there is no
abandonment of the earlier ontology, there is certainly a shift in emphasis and
the introduction of new ideas in the laler philosophy-new ideas which will have
consequences for Sartre's conceptualization of social science theory in general
and for existential psychoanalysis in particular. Here I would Iike to investigate
the significance of Sartre's usage ofthe terms need andpraxis (and its contrary,
hais) as these might relate to a Sartrean view of human development and to
existentially oriented psychotherapy. In doing so, I will make use both of ideas
tThis quote is from an interview wilb Michel Rybalka and olbers in 1he Philosophy 0/Jean-Paul
Sartre, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (La SaUe, Illinoi.: Open Court Publilhing Co., 1981), p. 17.
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from the Crilique and of ideas set fortb in an unpublished manuscript from the
mid-nineteen sixties2 wbich suggest a link: between Sartre's earlier discussion
of desire and bis later discussion of need to argue that desire is socially shaped
need. I believe that the usefulness of this conceptualization can be demonstrated
in Sartre's own description of Flaubert's early cbildhood development as weil
as in the case histories of existentially-oriented psychotherapists like myself.
Let us begin with praxis. Praxis, in Search for a Melhod and the Crilique
0/ Dialeetical Reason, is human goal-directed activity. More precisely, Sartre
defines praxis as "an organizing project which transcends material conditions
lowards an end and inscribes itself, through labour, in inorganic matter as a
rearrangement of the practical field and a reunification of means in the light of
the end. ,,3 ActuallY, despitelhis new socio-material orientation, praxis has
much in common with nihilating consciousness as described in Being and
NOlhingness. Praxis, like the nihilating movement of Being-for-itself, is
predicated 00 a relationship with the world as a perceived lack of future fullness.
Like the for-itself, praxis is self-explanatory and transparent to itself, though
Sartre adds that tbis intelligibility is "not necessarily expressible in words. ,,4
Sartre still insists, in a sentence which might have come straight out of Being
anti NOlhingness, that "consciousness, as apodictic certainty (ot) itself and as
consciousness of such and such an object" is the starting point for dialectical
reason.5 Praxis is human freedom, though nol in the voluntarist sense of
freedom without limitation. Even in his early philosophy, Sartre had always
conceived of freedom as siluated freedom.
2n.e section on need and delire cornel from S89 pagel of uno...anized notel from the middle
of the nineteen sixtiel. Thi. manuacript i. diacuued by Robelt Stone and Elizabeth Bowman in an
article published in Sanre AUve, ed. Ronald Aronaon and Adrian Van Den Hoven (Detroit: Wayne
State Univeraity Press, 1991, pp. 53-82) and aiao by Julieue Simont in -Morale eslh~tique, morale
militante: au-dell de la faribole,· Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 87, no. 73, FebNary 1989,
pp. 23-58. The paraphrase here ia my own and i. based on the original manuacript.
3Jean-Paul Sartre, The Critique 0/ Dialectical Reason (1960), trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith
(London: Verso/NLB), 1982), p. 734. Thi. will hereafter be referred to in these notes a. Critique.
4Crilique, p. 93.
5Crilique, p. 51.
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The difference is that in Sartre's later formulation the "situation" inevitably
involves work on the socio-material world which is designed, at the most basic
level, to produce organismic survival; at the same time, praxis is inextricably
interlinked with its socio-material milieu. Sartre therefore insists that "in an
individual Iife, each praxis uses Ihe whole of culture and becomes both
synchronie (in the ensemble of the present) and diachronie (in its human
depth). "6 The later Sartre is concemed to dissociate himself from some of bis
more radical earlier statements about the fact that one is free in any situation
whatever. Although this is ontologically true, one must distinguish between an
ontological freedom which allows one to freely live out the sentence which a
society has passed on one and the kind of real freedom whieh more genuinely
human society might provide for everyone. Nonetheless, Sartre still insists in the
Crilique that dialectical reason, in attempting to elucidate human praxis, must
not reduce change to identity; because praxis is not reducible to the material
objects and social relations which it intemalizes, it is capable of producing
novelty. As Sartre notes, ifwe do not "distinguish the project, as transcendence,
from circumstances, as conditions, we are left with nothing but inert objects,
and History vanishes. ,,7
Transcendence remains the key to Sartre's later philosophy as weil as to
his ethico-political position. In the Crilique, however, Sartre wishes to locate
transcending praxis at a much more basic level thanthat allocated to
consciousness in Being antI NOlhingness. He therefore no longer terms the
fundamental relationship between consciousness and its objects desire; instead
he designates this relationship as one of need. Lest the readerthink that the later
Sartre has embraced some kind of instinctualism, however, we must hasten to
add that need according to Sartre's conception is a human future-directed
relationship with the world rather than an instinctual force. Far from a "vis a
lergo pushing the human labourer," need is "the Iived perception of a goal
aimed at, and this goal is, in the first instance, simply restoration of the
organism. "8 It is this "first instance" which distinguishes need in the Crilique
6Crilique, p. 55.
7Crilique, p. 92.
8Criliqlle, p. 90
133
from desire in Being and NOlhingness. The original negation of tbe negation is
very simply involved witb survival itself.
Actually, as Sartre bimself admits in tbe unpublisbed manuscript referred
to above, need never appears in the already socialized buman world in its pure
fonn-except perhaps at birth. Olberwise, need is already socialized. And
socialized need, as Sartre points out, is desire. It does not involve mere
reproduetion o/Ihe organism but produet;on 0/a selfat a more advanced level
of tbe dialectic. It is tbe self as value wbich is the object of desire ralber tban
tbe simple continued existence of the organism. And Sartre maintains that while
pure need is praetical in the sense of heing survival-oriented, desire is elhical
in the sense of heing value-making. But just as the organie individual founds and
limits the socialization of the serial individual and the common individual of
groups, while never appearing in a pure unsocialized state, so need, tbough
nowhere to be found in its pure form, founds desire. Even in the Crilique,
Sartre had been careful to point out that need is always socialized. Por example,
be notes tbat "tbe labourer's work, bis manner of producing himselj, conditions
not only the satisfaction of his need, but also the need itself.·9 As Rohert Stone
and Elizabeth Bowman point out in an article, however, this founding of the
Sartrean dialectic on organismic need as tbe bedrock of desire is important
because it "makes complete interiorization of impotence impossible. ,,10 There
is a point in oppression at which tbe slave must revolt.
ODe can, however, go a long way toward distorting and denying needs
before tbis revolt will occur. Throughout the Crilique Sartre points out that it
is possible to turn praxis ioto hexis,11 changing transcendence ioto mere
reproduclion of the past/support of the status quo. In asense, this recreation of
the past is an activity of free praxis, but it is an activity whicb undermines that
freedom in that people find tbemselves caught in the ·passive activity· of
9Criliql4e, p. 95.
l~obert Stone in coUaboration with Elizabcth Bowman, •Dialcctical Elhica: A Fint Look at
Sartre's Unpublished 1964 Rome Lecture Notea," Social TUI, vol. 13, no. 4, winter-spring, 1986,
p.208.
11Shcridan-Smilh uses ais in his translation, but Haul Dames reminds me lhatlhe breath mark,
exis, in lhe original makes lhe correct rendering huis.
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obeying the exigenc.ies inscribed in matter and the socio-material order. And
while tbis tuming of praxis into hexis is an inescapable aspect of being human,
since it arises with the creation of the practico-inert which is an inescapable
outcome of the objectification process itself, Sartre objects to its overabundance
in a world dominated by scarcity. In such a world, needs are often denied or
distorted through tbis transformation, despite the fact 'that the creation of the
practico-inert is in the first instance intended to be need-satisfying. Sartre cites
the example of certain semi-employed day laborers in the south of ltaly who,
constantly malnourished, live their hunger as hexis. They only expect one meal
a day or every other day and degrade their vitality accordingly to live in astate
of semi-starvation. 12 Only the denial of that one meal, we might surmise,
would be likely to arouse revolt against a situation which is othelWise deemed
normal. Similarly, Sartre notes in the unpublished manuscrlpt and in his
biography of Flaubert, ordinary children from middle class households may
leam to deny or distort their needs-turning praxis into hexis.
Before we can fully appreciate this insight, however, we must first
understand further how need, through relations with others in the socio-material
world, is transformed into desire. This idea is especially significant for
existential psychoanalysis, as it will allow us to begin to conceptualize a kind of
Sartrean developmental theory. In the unpublished manuscript mentioned above,
Sartre discusses how organismic disturbances which in their pure form are
referred to as needs get transfonned through interpersonal encounters into
desires. From the beginning of life , the responses of others to an infant's
organismic needs unveil that infant's being to him or her. To the infant's appeal,
the adult caretaker responds by giving or withholding satisfaction. Gradually,
through this interaction, appeal to the Other is transformed into demand or right
over the other. The infant comes to expect its crles to bring satisfaction in the
form of mother's ministrations.
Sartre also explains that needs become intermixed-and symbolic of each
other-in t~e context of the family. Alimentation, for instance, becomes sexual
and sexual need becomes a way of eating. Artificial desires abstract themselves
from cultivated needs. For instance, smoking may refer to eating, nursing,
sexuality. By the time a person reaches adulthood, no need appears in its pure
form. Allhave been transfonned into desires. Take, for instance, eating. Neither
12Crilique, p. 95.
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the gourmet nor the ascetic experieoces hunger as simple need. The gourmet
subsumes simple hunger in an elaborate social ritual witb an end wbich is not
mere organismic survival, but a particular kind of satisfaction wbich has
aesthetic as weil as nutritional goals; nor can tbe ascetic witb simple bread and
bowl escape living hunger as desire, since the ascetic's choice is etbical
(value-making) rather than merely nutritional. As for sexuality, it is always
much more complex tban simple satisfaction of an organismic urge. Sexual
desire involves a transformation of such organismic disturbances through
language and fantasy into a demand to be (tbis or that kind of person) through
(this or that kind ot) sexual possession of (this or tbat) object.
The responses of tbe first care-givers are extremely important to tbe way
in which an individual comes to live his or her needs/desires in the world. If the
mother or primary care-giver responds withjoy, acceptance, and understanding,
then need, as Sartre contends in tbe Flaubert biography, will be transformed into
adesire which is feit as tbe perpetual possibility for action validating-or
·valorizing,· to use Sartre's own term-oneself and one's needs/desires in the
socio-material world. 13 But if, Sartre points out in the unpublisbed manuscript,
the primary care-giver responds with irritation, disdain, or hostility, then need
will tend to posit itself as illegitimate or culpable need. The infant's need will
have been socialized as a kind of prima) being guilty-and tbis heing guilty will
come to be feit as an essential aspect of my heing since each time organismic
need is rebom (as it is perpetually rebom) my heing guilty will be rebom. Not
only my present, but my future (as need wbich has to he fulfilled) is implicated
in the reproduction of guilt. For example, I am guilty for heing hungry, siek,
·needy· in general-and I am ashamed of my needs/desires. Such guilt is a
response to my being there, my very existence as a needing organism, which is
reflected back to me as undesirable in tbis way or that by the original otbers. In
psychotherapy, we constantly encounter such ontological guilt.
Sartre's example in 'lhe manuscript we are citing is anorexia. Tbe anorexic,
Sartre hypothesizes, displays the desire for a guilt-free need which most be
relieved of culpability by the Other's demand and supplication to eat. What the
anorexic wants, Sartre teils us, is to experience a need which is wanted by tbe
13Jean-Paul Sartre, 7Jae Family Idiot, vol. one (1971), traOl. Carol Cosman (Cbicago Ind
London: The University ofChicago Prel., 1981), pp. 133-34. This will bereafter be referred to in
these notes I. Family ldiol, vol. 1.
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Other-as the anorexic's original need was apparently unwanted by the original
others. The problem is that only a universal supplication could erase the original
guilt-and tbis is impossible. The meaning of anorexia thus lies in the movement
of desire as a rejeetion 01 need in order 10 be supplicaled. Similarly, forbidden
desire may look for a satisfaction whicb simultaneously punishes it and thereby
purifies it-as happens in masochism and various other forms of self-destruction.
Failure also is an example of need transformed into desire, in this case the
desire to prove, by the impossibility of living, that there is an inverse to this
impossibility-fulfillment in a more human world.
Obviously, though Sartre's examples are mostly negative, the
transformation of need into desire can involve positive as weil as negative
development. On the other hand, therapists mostly encounter situations in which
development has been painful and Sartre's descriptions are extremely helpful
here. Nor is Sartre, in the manuscript cited above, onaware of 'the difficulties
involved in a person's attempting to change the fundamental attitude formed in
earliest infancy. This is so partially because the very eyes with which one will
see new experiences have been clouded by this earliest experience, which must
he retotalized each time one encounters something new. The past is surpassable,
but only as taken into the detotalization and retotalization as a significant aspect
of what is now practico-inert. As my original heing there, this first experience
of need as shaped by others into desire is very difficult to surpass in the sense
of overcoming my guilt.
This is true because in objectifying myself I reproduce myself and tbis
reproduction in the first instance means culpability (if I have experienced a
negative response from the original others; othelWise, it means myself as gift,
as possibility). My culpability gains the intimate force of need itself. The
violence of my hunger, for instance, is the violence of my guilt. What I demand
of the satisfaction of my desire is therefore areturn to innocence-a restoration
of an innocence which in a sense I never had, since in discovering my need I
discovered myself guilty before the original others. What I want is recognition
of myself as innocent in the world of the Other; but this recognition is
impossible, first because even though the Other might change this would be for
other reasons than to validate me and secondly because I at present structure
reality in such a way that I probably could not see the change. Thus Sartre says
that a long work on the part of the Other is required to free me of my guiIt.
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Presumably this is apart of the work of psychotherapy. 118 aim is not
unsocialized need, but need/desire freed of the original condemnation.
Sartre's own approach to the Flaubert biography includes a description of
the transformation of need into desire (or rather i18 failure) along the lines set
fortb in the unpublished manuscript. In The Family Idiot, Sartre attemp18 to
show how an unvalorized child, Gustave Flaubert, came to live bis need more
as hexisthan as praxis and thereby to adopt the mode of "passive action" as an
integral part of his fundamental project. According to Sartre, Flaubert, as an
"underloved" child, experienced as an infant the dutiful but cold ministrations
of bis mother. Madame Flaubert, Sartre hypothesizes, provided only the best
physical care for her son, often anticipating in overly protective fashion his
needsbefore they even had a chance to manifest themselves. But in doing so she
treated her son as an objeCl rather than as a subject, depriving him of the
opportunity to develop an active sense of himself as affecting the world. At an
"age when hunger cannot be distinguished from sexual desire" and when
"feeding and hygiene condition the first aggressive mode of behavior," Sartre
believes that Flaubert was deprived of a sense that he could aggressively satisfy
his own needs/desires. 14
This early passivity was not remedied by Flaubert's encounter with a
father who acted the pater familias and expected obedience. Even that part of
Flaubert's interaction with his father which might have been expected to support
him as an agent, his father's insistence on an active furtherance of the Flaubert
family glory, escaped Gustave. He simply could not imagine what it meant to
act in any real sense; instead he play-acted, dutifully producing the gestures
wbich were expected of him by others. He also disappointed his father by his
failure to leam to read easily Iike his older brother, a failure which Sartre
attributes to the fact that reading requires an active participation of wbich the
young Flaubert was little capable. As an escape from the adult world where he
was other to himself, Gustave sank into passive ecstasies in which a pantheistic
union with nature had the real meaning of obliterating self and world together-a
state in which, as Sartre says, "the soul wants nothing, feels nothing, desires
nothing. " I S
14Family Idiol, vol. I, p. 48.
15Family Idiol, val. I, 32.
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Later oß, as. an adult, Flaubert would complain of a "secret wound, "
which Sartre identified as the "passive constitution" wbich resulted from bis
earliest interpersonal relations, and of an ennui which never left bim. Describing
himself as an adolescent, Flaubert wrote that he was a "mushroom swollen with
boredom. ,,16 He would envy less talented souls who were able simply to feel
and to act, and he would develop a sexuality wbich revolved around a fantasy
of passive ravishment and which found its fulfillment in sporadic adventures
with prostitutes and a long distance relationsbip with tbe volatile Louise Colet
rather than in real mutuality or commitment. AB a mature writer, Flaubert would
show a preoccupation with gestures, ceremonies, and objects rather than with
reciprocal relations and with actions. 100ugb be transformed bis early project
through an (imaginary) relationsbip with art wbich Sartre also deemed
inauthentic, Flaubert was never able to overcome the passivity and isolation
which derived from bis original relationsbip with others. He was never able to
turn hexis into praxis or to leam the lessons of an active desire or positive
reciprocity.
Actually, such people as Sartre describes Flaubert as heing are not
uncommon in therapy. I think especially of a client with whom I have worked
whose life might be described as a kind of epitome of hexis. This client's
mother, apparently an extremely self-eentered, narcissistic woman, had
consistently responded to him in ways wbich seemed designed to block the
development of an active desire. In effect, she never heard anything which he
asked ofher. Instead she substituted her own suppositionsabout who he was and
what he needed or wanted for any communications he might have given her on
the subject. This client describes himself as being a very passive, "good" child
as far back as memory goes. A particularly poignant memory involves a
Christmas at horne at about age eight. My client had dutifully, but not very
hopefully, made out a Christmas list. As custom had it, he and his brother were
allowed to select one gift for opening on Christmas Eve. My client selected a
small package, which he imagined to be a toy car he had requested. When he
opened tbis gift, bis dismay at discovering "com spears" (spears for holding
com on the cob) instead of tbe desired vehicle was greeted by the uproarious
16Family Idiot, vol. I, p. 142. Haul E. Damcs, in Sartre and Flaubert (Chicago and London:
The Univcrsity of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 33, translatcs Ibis phrase al "a mushroom stuffcd with
ennui.-
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laughter of bis mother. Not only could she not hear, but her not hearing
appeared to malicious. "From that time on," he told me sadly, "I decided never
to put anything on my list wbich I really wanted-or probably even to want
anything. "
This man's difficulties were very similar to those wbich Sartre describes
for Flaubert. A1though he did not become a writer like Flaubert (he was
interested in writing), it was evident that he used reading as an escape from the
real world. Asked about the fact that he had bidden bimself away in a world of
books from a very young age, he replied, "Oh, yes, 1 read in order not to be. "
In bis relationships with women, he was even more avoidant than Flaubert.
After ending a marriage wbich was largely sexless according 10 his wife's
desire, he attempted to establish relations with other women. Wbat he
discovered was an extreme reluctance to even feel sexual desire in a woman's
presence. On a rare occasion when he established a short sexual relationship
with a woman, he described bimself as lacking any feeling in bis penis after
penetration. "I was only aware of her and not of myself at all." His lack of
desire showed up in other areas of his life as weil. For example, he reported
baving to force bimself to eat regular meals despite the fact that he had no idea
whatever of what he might want to eat. Also, even though he was a successful
consultant in a technical field, he reported having no earthly notion about what
he might want to do with all the money he made.
A seemingly casual remark which this client made one day in therapy
provided an opening into his dilemma. He commented that when people
telephoned hirn, they frequently waited a moment after he answered "because
they think I'm an answering machine. " "Bven you," he went on to say,
"mistook me for an answering machine when you called the other day." I
realized that what he said was true. And it occurred to me that the quality in his
voice wbich caused him to be mistaken for an answering machine was a quality
I often experienced there-the quality of not expecling an answer. His childhood
had foreclosed the possibility of bis learning to appeal to others for an answer
or to expect/demand that bis needs be met. At tbis point, tbis client began to
remember rather vividly what a "desert" (his word) his childhood bad been. He
bad leamed there so weil how to lransform praxis into hexis that the wbole
world now appeared to be a similar desert in which he embraced the anti-value
of "never desiring anything." As praxis began to be reawakened, he began to
experience the pain, tbe humiliation, and tbe extreme loneliness which he had
140
previously avoided· by deadening himself and curtailing his desires. Unlike
Sartre's Flaubert, he was finally no longer bored.
I think we can DOW understand the interconnection between organismic
needs and relational "needs" or desires. It is only when organismic needs are
met and shaped in a hospitable human environment that desire develops as a
viable and real relationship with the world of objects and other people. Of
course, as we know from Sartre's earlier philosophy, demand must be
relinquished as a right over others if one is to develop relations in good faith.
But unless the infant comes first to experience agency in being able to bring
about the fulfillment of needs by the original caregiver, then to the extent that
agency is denied that infant will have leamed to live need as hexis rather than
as praxis. The young cbild in such a situation willieam to experience bis or her
being in the world of desire as a being passive. Such a child will be more object
than subject, and what will develop is something akin to the "false selfM
described by psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott. The problem, however, is that
there is no "troe self" to be uncovered;tbe release of spontaneity will require
extensive work to experience in a new way those needs which are perpetually
rebom to be perpetually denied. The fact that they are perpetually rebom,
however, allows existentialist therapy to claim that a radical reorientation of
oneself as a needing/desiring praxis is possible. The client in therapy must find
a way within the therapeutic relationship to transform hexis into praxis-thereby
discovering a viable real future which that person has never before experienced.
In this respect, on the individual if not on the group level, existentialist therapy
might be conceived of as revolutionary praxis.
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